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ESTABLISHING RULE OF LAW IN POST-WAR IRAQ:
REBUILDING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
John C. Williamson*
At the end of April 2003, as major combat operations came to a close, the
United States was faced with the daunting task of reinstituting the rule of law
in Iraq. The invasion of the country and the removal of Saddam Hussein from
power had been undertaken with an understanding by the United States and its
Coalition allies that they would shoulder much of the responsibility for this
task. Furthermore, as the occupying power we had a legal obligation to
reestablish governmental functions, including those associated with the justice
system.' In my role as the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice in those
first months after the war, I had the opportunity to participate directly in this
process and, to some extent, guide the direction of the emerging justice system.
I had previously served in a similar role as the Director of the Department
of Justice in the United Nations-administered government in Kosovo. In that
capacity--effectively the Minister of Justice-I supervised Kosovo's courts,
prosecutors, and the prisons, as well as other organs of the justice system. In
Kosovo, my authority and my mandate were very clear. Justice and police
powers were reserved to the United Nations, and although the vast majority of
jurists and staff were Kosovars, the management and control of the justice
system were firmly in the hands of the international community.
In the immediate aftermath of the war in Iraq, control of the justice system
also ended up in the hands of internationals by default. With the fall of
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Saddam Hussein's regime, the ministers and the most senior officials in
government agencies fled or went into hiding.' The resulting power vacuum
could only be filled by the Coalition, and although the intention was for
individuals such as myself to serve as advisors to the Iraqis, we found at least
at the outset that there was no Iraqi management structure to advise. Thus, for
the first few weeks, the senior advisors were effectively running the ministries
and were the only ones in a position to ensure that they became functional
again. So, with a mandate that was somewhat more ambiguous than I had had
in Kosovo, the task was in many ways more challenging. This was due, in
part, to the fact that the Coalition understandably wanted to be viewed as
liberators, not occupiers. Our status under international law was very clear,
however, and we had certain responsibilities and obligations as an occupying
power, namely to maintain orderly government and to ensure public security.'
As we fulfilled those responsibilities, though, we were always mindful of not
being too heavy-handed lest we erode our image as liberators. It was a
difficult balance to maintain-instituting needed changes but doing so in a
fashion that did not create resentment or hostility. This is true in all peace-
keeping or post-conflict missions, but the nature of our intervention in Iraq was
such that it made this task even more challenging and important that we
succeed.
In the case of the Ministry of Justice, I was very fortunate. The mid-level
Iraqi officials that remained were extremely cooperative and were willing to
work with me from the outset. They recognized the need for changes and they
eagerly embraced our efforts to bring them about. Perhaps more significantly,
we found that the Ministry was not nearly as tainted as one would have
imagined. In a country like Saddam's Iraq, one would expect that the Ministry
of Justice and the courts would be important instruments of oppression.
Undoubtedly, they played a role, but the regime primarily relied on a parallel
court system to target its opponents rather than on the "legitimate" courts
under the Ministry of Justice. Cases of real interest to the regime tended to be
shunted to these parallel structures such as the Revolutionary Court, the
Ministry of Interior Court, the Military Courts, and similar institutions. There
were exceptions, but what remained in the normal courts were largely common
2 See, e.g., Anthony Shadid, Hussein's Baghdad Falls, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2003, at Al,
2003 WL 17427430.
' See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, pt. III, § III; see also S.C. Res. 1483, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) ("recognizing the specific
authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law" of the occupying
powers).
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crime cases and civil cases in which the regime had no stake and in which the
parties were of no concern to the government. Corruption was rife and there
were other practices, such as use of confessions obtained through torture,
which compromised the system, but the worst human rights abuses were taking
place elsewhere. As a result, we at least had a base upon which we could
rebuild. In saying this, I do not wish to downplay the challenges involved in
fighting corruption or in educating jurists about concepts of due process-they
are formidable. Nevertheless, it is easier to address these problems than to try
to salvage a court system in which all of the jurists could be linked to officially
sanctioned murders, torture, or other serious human rights abuses.
Another positive finding was that the courts and the Ministry of Justice had
a relatively low number of committed, senior Ba'ath Party members on their
employment rolls. Under Saddam, membership in the Ba'ath Party was a
prerequisite for advancement in the government. Nevertheless, it was possible
to draw a distinction between those who participated in the party solely to
ensure a livelihood and those who were zealous Ba'athists. The comparatively
low number in the Ministry of Justice was due in part to the nature of the work
and the onerous requirements for service as a jurist. In order to become a
judge or prosecutor, an individual had to complete four years of university
study in law and then a two-year course at the Judicial Training Institute.4 This
was a significant commitment of time and effort for a job that offered only
limited opportunities for advancement in the Ba'ath Party and the government.
Also, it was apparent that the real power lay elsewhere-in the parallel courts
or in other party or governmental organs. As a result, the Ministry was not
necessarily the first choice for ambitious Ba'athists or "party hacks." Instead,
we found that the judges and prosecutors were generally well-educated and had
a fairly sophisticated view of the law. Most felt that they had been
marginalized under Saddam, and they were quite eager to prove that they could
handle the responsibilities that shifted to them with the dissolution of the
parallel court system.
Despite these positive factors, there were a number of significant problems
that we confronted from the outset. In addition to corruption there was the
shortage ofjudges and prosecutors. Due to the existence of the parallel courts,
there were not enough jurists in the normal court system to handle the volume
of cases that would end up there when everything was consolidated in these
courts. Also, in many places, some of the worst judges and prosecutors had
4 INT'L LEGAL ASSISTANCE CONSORTIUM, REPORT FROM AN ILAC MISSION TOIRAQ 13-20
AUGUST 2003 7 (2003), available at http://www.ilac.se/sajt/bilder/pdf/IraqReport.pdf.
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resigned in the face of pressure from their local populations immediately after
the war. While this was a positive step, it nevertheless contributed to the
shortage of jurists in the system.
Perhaps the most daunting problem was dealing with the destroyed
infrastructure. This overwhelmed everything else and blocked progress on all
fronts until it was rectified. During the war itself, and in the looting and civil
unrest that followed, approximately seventy-five percent of the courts in Iraq
were destroyed, including ninety percent in Baghdad alone. Most were left as
burned-out shells, stripped of all furniture, wall and floor coverings, electrical
lines, and water pipes. There had been few computers before the war, but
those had disappeared. All of the court records and files also met the same
fate. Likewise, the central Ministry of Justice building in Baghdad was an
empty shell, as was almost every other building and facility associated with the
Ministry. Damage to the infrastructure also extended to the communications
network, which was nonexistent for the first few months after the war. Thus,
all communications with Ministry officials had to take place in person; there
were no functioning telephones. Conducting business this way in Baghdad
was difficult, but it was virtually impossible beyond the Baghdad area. As the
security situation started deteriorating in late May 2003, this problem was
compounded even further as face-to-face meetings became harder to arrange.
My most pressing responsibility as Senior Advisor was to ensure that the
Ministry of Justice became functional again as soon as possible. Confronted
with the situation I have described above, my colleagues and I undertook a
number of measures focused on the short-term objectives of reinstituting basic
justice functions and making the Ministry of Justice an operational entity.
Many of these actions were not specifically law-related, but it is equally
important that the practical problems associated with day-to-day operations be
addressed along with the more substantive issues of revisions to legal codes
and long-term reforms to the justice system. It is difficult to focus the
attention of local officials on these meatier issues until you can first establish
security, repair the buildings in which they will work, furnish them with
essential supplies, and start paying them. What follows is an overview of the
steps we took in the first months after the war, including our efforts to address
the more practical concerns and to start the process of long-term reform.
During the period when major combat operations were coming to a close,
and in their immediate aftermath, looting became a huge problem. I was in the
second group of civilians to go into Baghdad, and by the time I arrived there
the last week of April, most of the court buildings and other Ministry of Justice
facilities had been looted or damaged through vandalism. Much of the looting
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was perpetrated for the purpose of theft or economic gain; i.e., stealing
furniture, light fixtures, wiring, pipes, etcetera. However, some of the looting
was directed at undermining the justice system. Throughout the country, court
records were stolen in order to conceal the criminal histories of interested
parties. In one instance, looters went into the central property records archive
and, moving room to room, set fire to the files without touching anything else.
In many locations, Iraqis vented their anger at Saddam's regime by destroying
whatever local government buildings they could, simply because they now
could. No matter the underlying reason, however, this continuing destruction
of the infrastructure served to further weaken the justice system with each
passing day. Thus, from our first moment in Baghdad, our highest priority was
stopping the destruction before we lost any more buildings. Since there were
no Iraqi security organs, we were totally reliant on Coalition forces for this
function. Stretched thin, and with a constantly changing list of priorities, the
military was not in a position to secure every Ministry of Justice facility. By
identifying a few very-high priority locations, we were able to arrange for
military units to provide security. With the shortage of troops to perform all
of the tasks required, this was a short-term solution. We thus began working
to set up a security force, comprised of Iraqi guards. We got money to pay
them, provided them with weapons, and put them to work. This had an almost
immediate impact, but it took some time before these guards were capable of
handling all of the security responsibilities on their own. With the support of
Coalition troops, however, we were able to halt the looting and vandalism.
In order to determine the extent of damage to the infrastructure, we
undertook an inventory of courthouses and other Ministry of Justice facilities
throughout the country. Since communications and transport outside Baghdad
were so difficult at the outset, we focused our initial efforts on the Baghdad
area to determine which facilities were usable or could be repaired easily. We
then channeled resources toward the rehabilitation of key facilities such as the
main Ministry of Justice building and the Judicial Training Institute where we
could temporarily consolidate functions that would normally be performed
elsewhere. Additionally, we provided money to the chiefjudges of appellate
court districts to use to repair and refurbish courthouses in their respective
districts.
Amazingly, we found that there were two courthouses in Baghdad which
were virtually undamaged. Fortunately, there was one on each side of the
Tigris River, so in an effort to get courts functioning again we consolidated all
of the district courts for Baghdad into these two facilities. We brought judges,
prosecutors, investigators, and administrators from the various districts to hear
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the cases that would normally be heard in their respective courthouses. When
we opened these two facilities on May 8, 2003, it was largely a symbolic
gesture. We were able to bring a few arrested subjects there for initial
appearances, but at that point the mechanisms were still not working well
enough to feed detainees through the court system on a regular basis. It was
important for Iraqis to see that the courts were beginning to handle criminal
cases again, but it took some time before we completely resolved the logistical
and security problems which allowed for a steady flow of defendants into the
Iraqi courts.
As we re-opened courts, a pressing question emerged as to the law that
would be applied. The 1969 Penal Code was the law that governed criminal
proceedings in Iraq and it was generally satisfactory. During Saddam's reign,
however, he had introduced numerous amendments to the Code, many of
which were unacceptable. Provisions which prescribed any criticism of
Saddam and made the offense punishable by death, for example, were clearly
egregious. Other provisions were not as outrageous, but were still problematic
for one reason or another. It was clear that certain provisions of the Code
would have to be suspended, but final decisions had not been made on which
would be. The debate also got caught up on the issue of the death penalty; the
Iraqis wanted to retain the death penalty, but some of our allies in the Coalition
disagreed. In the end, the death penalty was suspended for the period of
occupation. As a result of these ongoing discussions, however, no changes to
the substantive law had been put into effect on the day we opened the first
courts. Thus, the 1969 Penal Code, including all of Saddam's amendments,
was still the controlling law at that point. We worked out an agreement,
however, with judges, prosecutors, and senior police officials that they would
not attempt to enforce laws that were obviously egregious. This was not an
ideal solution, but it served the purpose until the revised Code could be put in
place. Realizing the urgency of the situation, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) General Counsel worked very hard to get the provisional
code issued. Fortunately, in the intervening period there were no instances of
jurists abusing the system and using problematic charges from the old Code.
Within days of my arrival in Baghdad in late April we arranged a meeting
with the senior and mid-level managers who had remained, after Saddam' s fall,
in the Ministry of Justice. We met at the main Ministry building which at that
time was an empty shell, stripped bare during the looting. As we met, a
firefight was going on between U.S. troops and remnants of the Iraqi army a
couple of blocks away, so our first discussions took place in a tense and still-
dangerous environment. However, the danger did not dampen the enthusiasm
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of the Iraqi participants; they were eager to discuss what we could do to
rebuild the Ministry and to get them and their staffs back to work. Most of
those I met with that day were directors general of the Ministry, individuals
who headed up the various directorates (roughly equivalent to divisions in the
U.S. Department of Justice). As a first step, I asked each of them to compile
a list of everything they needed to get their respective directorates functional
again-at least at a basic level-and also to identify a group of core personnel
who would go to work first and would ensure that the most vital tasks were
being performed. This input from those who knew the Ministry best was
invaluable as we made our initial decisions on how to apply resources. The
exercise allowed them to focus their thinking on immediate needs and to
prioritize tasks. It also made them recognize that they had a vital role to play
in reconstituting the Ministry; it was not going to be done solely by interna-
tionals.
To oversee Ministry operations for the near-term, we established a
management committee which I chaired and which was comprised of the
directors general. We met at least once a week for the entire time that I was
in Baghdad, although meetings often occurred more frequently. Over time,
responsibility for day-to-day operations shifted more to the members of this
committee, allowing me and my colleagues in the CPA to spend more time on
long-term reform issues.
A very practical concern became apparent in the first meetings: the dire
state of Ministry finances. This had a direct impact on our ability to operate
and it had a very real effect on the Ministry employees who had not been paid
in two months. As a result, we had to devote a considerable amount of time
to preparing a provisional budget, recovering financial records, creating
mechanisms for funding, and reinstituting salary payments. The resumption
of salary payments was particularly difficult because the pay system utilized
during Saddam's regime was no longer tenable. It had provided extremely low
base salaries for almost everyone, but supplemented this pay with bonus
payments that were given out for acts of loyalty to the regime. It was
necessary, then, to establish an equitable system in which employees received
pay based on their job category and the work they were doing rather than on
political loyalty. A government-wide plan was instituted by the Ministry of
Finance which accomplished this, and while this was certainly a positive move,
it nevertheless required tremendous effort to go through and classify the
12,000 employees of the Ministry into appropriatejob categories and to ensure
that they were all paid.
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In mid-May, the U.S. Department of Justice dispatched a group of
approximately fifteen judges, prosecutors, and court administrators to Iraq to
conduct an assessment of the justice system. They were divided into four
teams which traveled around the country recording what was happening in
various regions and what the state of the infrastructure was in those areas.
This was our first attempt to get a comprehensive overview of the situation
throughout the country. While the reports did provide us with a valuable first
look at places outside Baghdad, the quality of reporting varied from team to
team and from area to area. Also, in the rapidly evolving dynamic that was
post-war Iraq, the information quickly became dated. Since the assessment
team deployment was a one-time phenomenon, we had to establish some sort
of regular reporting mechanism. It was clear that our only reliable means of
collecting information would have to be through military channels. We were
receiving sporadic reports from various units, but these were mostly anecdotal
in nature. In order to get a more comprehensive view, with standardized
information, we worked with the military command to issue an order to all
units throughout Iraq to report on justice and security sector activities in their
respective areas of responsibility (AORs). We were trying to get an accurate
picture of which courts were operating; if judges and prosecutors were
working, and if so, how many; if prisons were functional; how many police
were working; and similar information. The order directed units to provide
regular reports on these questions and to keep us informed ofthe actions they
were taking. As these reports began coming in, it provided us with a much
better perspective on the situation throughout Iraq.
It was important to accurately ascertain what was happening around the
country because it directly impacted our efforts to implement a consistent
approach to the justice system nationwide. Until we knew what was occurring
from place to place, it would have been difficult to issue guidance that would
be beneficial. Outside of Baghdad, military commanders were largely
responsible for reestablishing governmental organs in their respective AORs.
From place to place, the approach varied. In some locations, the commanders
were extremely successful and in other areas, less so. In some instances, they
were following the exact same approach but the underlying dynamics on the
ground varied, so the results varied as well. It was important to determine
what was working and what was not before we instituted policies that might
not be productive. Based on the information we received from the Justice
Assessment Team and then from military reporting channels, combined with
what we had found to work in Baghdad, we drafted a directive that was issued
to all military component commanders and CPA regional offices. This
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directive provided detailed guidance on what should be done to reinstitute
justice functions throughout the country, including instructions on the
processes for temporarily suspending judges, for appointing provisional
replacement judges, and the substantive and procedural laws to be applied. It
was an important first step in establishing an integrated, national justice
system.
The measures that I have discussed above were all focused on immediate
problems and doing what was necessary to get the system functional again-if
even at just a basic level. To ensure that we were creating something that
would be sustainable over the long-term, and which would provide Iraqis with
a fair justice system, it was vital that we also focused on more substantial
reform initiatives.
Perhaps the most important factor in instituting successful reform was the
assurance that we had a professional, credible judiciary. Despite the fact that
a parallel court system existed and that many of the worst abuses occurred
there, it was clear that a significant number of judges and prosecutors in the
Ministry of Justice system were also tainted by their past conduct. In some
instances, they had a history of corruption. In others, the jurists had been
involved in human rights abuses. In either case, it was important that we
identified the worst offenders since their continuing involvement in the
criminal justice system would undermine the credibility of the entire system.
To do this we set up the Judicial Review Committee (JRC),5 a variation on a
process we had employed in Kosovo.6 The JRC was comprised of a mix of
Iraqi and Coalition representatives. The senior Iraqi was a former appellate
judge who had been imprisoned by Saddam for failing to endorse a dictate of
the Revolutionary Command Council. He was universally well-regarded in the
Iraqi legal community and his participation in the process enhanced the
standing of the JRC significantly. The JRC was given a mandate to examine
the record of every judge and prosecutor in Iraq, to interview them, and to hear
from any relevant witnesses who emerged in the course of the inquiry.7 The
JRC was then to make a decision if the individual should be removed from
their function or should be allowed to continue.8
5 Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee, Ord. No. 15, Coalition Provisional
Authority, CPA/ORD/23 June 2003/15 (2003) [hereinafter Order 15].
6 See On the Establishment of the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, Reg. No.
2001/8, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2001/8 (2001),
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations2001/reg08-01 .html.
Order 15, supra note 5, § 3.
8 See id § 4.
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The JRC was also tasked with screening any new judges or prosecutors 9
(many of whom had been appointed on an interim basis by military command-
ers in the field) to determine if they were suitable. The JRC started work in
June 2003 and completed its reviews in mid-2004. By that time, over 800
judges and prosecutors had been investigated and approximately 170 were
removed"0 for corruption, linkages to human rights abuses, or other serious
breaches of conduct. The process was objective and transparent, it provided
an individualized examination of each person, and it afforded anyone who was
affected a hearing and an opportunity to present evidence in their defense.
Although it took months to complete this process, it was recognized by
Ministry employees as a fair means of screening and removing unsuitable
officials. As a result, this vetting process was embraced almost universally
within the Ministry of Justice-something which was not always the case in
other government departments where individuals were vetted out in a fashion
that was perceived to be less judicious.
After major combat operations had ended, there had been a downturn in
violence. Unfortunately, this was short-lived. After approximately one month,
violence was again on the upswing. As the insurgency intensified, security
concerns became paramount. This affected me and my colleagues directly as
it became harder to move about and attend meetings with our Iraqi counter-
parts. Beyond this practical impact, the violence also placed a burden on the
Ministry of Justice to respond and address the criminality in a more effective
fashion. In late May 2003, the courts were still in a nascent stage and were not
capable of dealing with the cases that were beginning to emerge from the
insurgency-at least in a consistently professional manner. Also, as we had
just started the JRC process at that point, we were not entirely confident that
all of the judges and prosecutors in the justice system could be relied upon to
act responsibly. As an immediate solution, we proposed to the Coalition
Administrator, Ambassador Paul Bremer, that we try to quickly identify some
of the better judges and prosecutors and that we assign them to a dedicated
court to deal with the most serious cases-those that threatened national
security. With his endorsement, we fashioned a proposal that to some extent
mirrored the international judge and prosecutor arrangement that is utilized in
Kosovo. We then worked with the CPA General Counsel to complete the
9 Seeid.
'o Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, An Historic Review of CPA Accomplish-
ments 22 (June 28, 2004), http://www.iraqcoaltion.org/pressreleases/0040628-historicreview
-cpa.doc.
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proposal and to put it into the form of an order that was eventually signed by
Ambassador Bremer, creating the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).I1
This then provided a forum for the most serious cases to be handled expedi-
tiously and with a degree of professionalism that still was not a certainty in the
regular criminal courts at that point. A small number criticized the CCCI as
a special court set up in the manner that Saddam created the parallel courts, but
this was not a view shared by the vast majority ofjudges and prosecutors who
embraced the concept. This was due to the fact that the CCCI was staffed by
qualified judges and prosecutors from the legitimate courts and, most
importantly, its actions were subject to review by the regular Iraqi appellate
courts. Thus, it was firmly placed in the Iraqi court structure. Since its
establishment, the CCCI has had over 215 cases referred to it and, as of August
2004, fifty-six trials have been completed. Even since the transfer of
sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government has
maintained the court as a valuable component in the criminal justice
system-the only one currently capable of handling the most serious and
sensitive cases on a day-to-day basis.
In the CPA orders that established the CCCI, and those that modified the
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, we provided certain
protections for defendants that had been absent in the Iraqi criminal justice
system. Foremost among these was the right to defense counsel from the
outset of judicial proceedings.' Previously, suspects were only entitled to
representation at trial, but the investigative phase in civil law jurisdictions is
perhaps as crucial to the ultimate outcome, so it was important to extend this
protection during this stage as well. Defendants were also provided for the
first time with the right to appointed counsel in minor cases, 13 some of which
had potential penalties of five years imprisonment. Arrested subjects were
given the right to remain silent in the face of questioning14 and a requirement
was instituted that they be advised of their rights when facing criminal
charges.' 5 Finally, confessions obtained through torture were proscribed, even
" The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, Ord. No. 13, Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA/ORD/18 June 2003/13 (2003) [hereinafter Order No. 13].
12 Order 13, supra note 11, § 22. Criminal Procedures, Mem. No. 3, Coalition Provisional
Authority, CPA/MEM/18 June 2003103 § 7 (2003) [hereinafter Memorandum 3].
13 Memorandum 3, supra note 12, § 7. Public Defender Fees, Ord. No. 53, Coalition
Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/16 January 2004/53 (2004).
'4 Memorandum 3, supra note 12, §§ 3-4.
'5 Id.
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in situations where the confessions were corroborated by other evidence. 6
While it was important to establish these protections, the quality of defense
counsel in Iraq made practical application less than perfect. This shortfall
should be rectified through training programs that have been established, but
it will take some time before the quality of representation is as good as it needs
to be.
In Iraq, as in many civil law countries, the courts were integrated into the
Ministry of Justice as opposed to being a completely independent branch of
government. This arrangement works well in many established democracies,
such as most of the countries in continental Europe. Judges in those systems
have substantive independence from the ministries of justice, but they are
much more closely linked administratively. In any event, it is not an
arrangement that should be dismissed out of hand or that should be seen as
necessarily inferior to the common law system where an absolute separation
of powers exists. In Iraq, however, the courts had been an independent branch
of government during the period of the monarchy and it was only under
Saddam that they lost all independence and became completely subjugated to
the Ministry of Justice, not just for administrative matters, but also in
substantive terms as well. To imbue the courts with the authority and the
stature they required to maintain rule of law, it was important to recreate the
independence the courts had prior to Saddam's rule. To accomplish this, we
reconstituted the Judicial Council (now the Higher Juridical Council) as an
organ independent of the Ministry of Justice and vested it with the authority
to appoint judges and to oversee administration of the courts.17 This step
effectively reestablished the courts as another branch of government.
At the same time, we moved to strengthen the Court of Cassation which is
the Iraqi equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court. As a high priority, we sought
to bring the court up to its full complement of thirty-five judges (split between
various chambers for criminal, civil, domestic relations, and financial affairs).
6 Id. § 3(d)(viii) (deleting language from the Criminal Procedure Code that had permitted
used of confessions where "there [was] no causal link between the coercion and the confession
or if the confession [was] corroborated by other evidence"). Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 para. 281
(English translation), http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homespages/AC/
CLAMO-Publics.nsf(last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
"7 Re-establishment of the Council of Judges, Ord. No. 35, Coalition Provisional Authority
§§ 1, 3, 5 & 6, CPAJORD/13 Sep 2003/35 (2003). Administration of Independent Judiciary,
Mem. No. 12, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/MEM/8 May 2004/12 (2004) (implement-
ing Order 25).
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In the last years of Saddam's rule, the court had been completely marginalized
and the number of judges had declined to about half of the intended number.
Under Saddam, jails and prisons were operated by various government
agencies, including the ministries of Defense and Interior and the intelligence
services, but primary responsibility for prisons rested with the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs. This chillingly Orwellian arrangement was meant
to convey to the outside world that prisons had a primarily rehabilitative role,
and as such were some sort of social welfare organ. The true nature of the
prisons, however, was anything but that. Torture and extra-judicial executions
were commonplace and the conditions under which prisoners were held were
abysmal. In order to ensure that prisons were operated more humanely and
that one legitimate prison system was established, we proposed that prison
operations be consolidated into the Ministry of Justice-an approach
consistent with that followed in the rest of the Middle East, in Europe, and in
the United States. Ambassador Bremer approved this move and a subsequently
executed CPA Order authorized the creation of a prisons directorate in the
Ministry of Justice, one responsible for operation of all civilian prison
facilities.' 8 Although Coalition forces continued to operate facilities for the
detention of security detainees throughout the period of occupation, we began
setting up civilian prisons, staffed by Iraqi correctional officers, which would
house the prisoners being processed through Iraqi courts. In light of the prison
practices employed under Saddam, we were unable to rely on any of the former
guards until they went through extensive retraining. This process is ongoing
and significant progress has been made. As with the courts, prison infrastruc-
ture was also extensively damaged. Rebuilding a network of correctional
facilities is crucial if the criminal justice system is to succeed. It is as vital a
component as the police or the courts.
In late June 2003, after instituting the above measures, we appointed the
first Iraqi Interim Minister of Justice, Judge Medhat Mahmud, who had
formerly headed the Judicial Council, and who had been a member of the Iraqi
Court of Cassation. He was universally respected by the other Ministry
officials and by the judges and prosecutors. He did an outstanding job
overseeing the Ministry until the separation of the courts became official and
is Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, Ord. No. 10, Coalition Provisional
Authority, CPA/ORD/8 June 2003/10 (2003) (vesting full authority and control in the Ministry
of Justice over all detention and prison facilities). Management of Detention and Prison
Facilities, Mem. No. 2, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/MEM/2 Jun 2003/2 (2003)
(prescribing "standards to be applied in the Iraqi prison system").
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
he moved over to once again become Chief Judge of the Court of Cassation
and Head of the Judicial Council.
As in any peacekeeping or post-conflict mission, there were a number of
incredible successes in Iraq, but there were also some unfortunate shortfalls.
I would like to think that the transformation of the Ministry of Justice and the
courts has been one of the successes. To the extent that this is true, it can be
attributed primarily to the factors that I cited at the beginning of this Comment.
Another factor which I believe contributed to the outcome, however, was the
experience that I, and some of my close colleagues in Iraq, brought to the
Ministry of Justice from prior peacekeeping missions. Having done this type
of work in a similar environment, we were perhaps better prepared than some
in the CPA for what we would be facing. We had worked in post-conflict
missions in the past and we had been through this process before. This was an
invaluable advantage since our learning curve was limited to the factors unique
to Iraq and not to the whole experience of working in a post-conflict environ-
ment.
One of the dangers of working in such an environment is the tendency to
become overwhelmed with the crises of any given day and to lose sight of
accomplishing the long-term objectives. It is very easy in a chaotic post-
conflict setting to get entangled in the crisis of the moment and one can easily
spend one-hundred percent of one's time responding to such events. If the
objective, however, is to build a structure that is sustainable over the long-
term, it is crucial to have a vision of what that structure should look like and
to devote time and resources to creating it. This may sound like a simple and
obvious statement, but it can be incredibly difficult to execute when one has
to contend with any number of pressing concerns, many of which have life-
threatening consequences. Fortunately, we were able for a variety of reasons
to keep the daily crises under control and to put in place the measures
necessary for long-term substantial reform.
As we examine what happened in Iraq, there are many lessons that can be
learned. We should not, however, see Iraq as the template for all future post-
conflict missions. It is much more likely that the United States will engage in
multilateral interventions with more frequency than in unilateral ones just as
we have in the past, but we should be better prepared for either contingency.
And whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia, or Haiti we
must keep in mind that an integrated approach is required. We must be able
to provide the whole range of government services when indigenous institu-
tions collapse. This is most crucial in the justice and security sector, because
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establishment of a secure environment is a prerequisite for every other
function.
If we are to accomplish this, we must address all of the justice and security
functions simultaneously. It is not enough just to set up a civilian police
capability, as was done in several past UN peacekeeping missions. For if the
police are to be successful there must be a court system and a corrections
capability. These various components are inextricably linked and they must
be developed in tandem. If the police arrest fifty people on a given day, there
must be a prison or jail capable of holding those fifty, and there must be a
court system capable of processing them. If any of the three components
cannot keep pace with the others, the system will falter.
We must recognize that no matter where stabilization missions take place
it is going to be difficult. Putting a shattered country back together again is
never easy. Whether it is the United States doing it, a specially-created
coalition, or the UN, the actor will face formidable challenges. There will be
successes and there will be failures. One enduring lesson from every post-
conflict mission, however, is that the forces for instability must be dealt with
as the highest priority. Many of the ingredients of instability that exist before
an armed conflict and which lead to outside intervention in the first place will
remain there after the conflict ends. They will continue to undermine efforts
to establish a secure environment in which rebuilding and reform can take
place. Thus, the justice and security component of any mission is crucial,
since the development of local capacities to deal with these threats is the only
true guarantor for success.
Our experience in Iraq crystallized the thinking of many in Washington that
the United States Government needs to establish a dependable post-conflict
civilian response capability. The lack of such a capability has been apparent
for the last ten years as we have pieced together, in an ad-hoc fashion, the
resources that we sent to Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq. Even
before the events in Iraq transpired, many who had worked in post-conflict
stabilization missions had recognized this need and efforts were launched in
various quarters to address the problem. I began working on this issue at the
National Security Council shortly after I commenced work there in January
2003 and, after returning from Iraq in July 2003, I again became engaged in
this project. As a result of Iraq, many more people were willing to focus on
the issue of how to respond to post-conflict contingencies. Eventually, we
presented a proposal to senior administration officials in April 2004 and we
secured their approval for the establishment of a standing post-conflict/crisis
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response office in the Department of State. 9 This is an important first step
which should, over time, allow the United States to be more effective and
efficient when it is forced to respond, either as part of a multilateral effort or
unilaterally, to crises around the world.
"9 See Press Release, Senator Richard G. Lugar, State Department to Establish Stabilization
and Reconstruction Office (July 6, 2004), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.
cfm?id=223639. As of September 27, 2004, the U.S. Department of State had established the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstitution and Stabilization (S/CRS), http://careers.state.gov/
student/particip.html#scrs (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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